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7. Conclusion 
This final chapter seeks to provide answers to the initial research questions, identify shortcomings of 
the research methods used, and offer avenues for future research. It concludes with potential 
overarching policy implications.  
 
7.1 Answers to research questions 
The introduction posed the following broad questions that motivated this research:  
 Do cross-border capital flows undermine or strengthen domestic financial stability? Should 
countries continue to liberalize their capital account, or should they impose capital restrictions? 
 Does large-scale official sector support work? Under what circumstances is support effective in 
containing market stress? 
 How does UMP affect inequality?  
 
In order provide concrete answers and focus the analysis into manageable aspects, these broad 
interests were translated into more specific research questions. Thus, for financial openness and cross-
border capital flows, Part I of this dissertation sought to answer: 
 How does financial openness affect a country’s vulnerability to a currency crisis? 
 How do international capital flows interact with domestic credit excesses, and with the 
vulnerability of a country to banking crises? 
 
The empirical analysis in Part I finds stability benefits of financial openness, yet risks from large gross 
capital (debt) inflows, and important differences between advanced and emerging market economies. 
In a large cross-country panel, financial openness as measured by the Chinn-Ito Index is associated 
with a lower probability of currency crises over the past three decades (chapter 2). This effect is weaker 
(negative but statistically insignificant) for emerging market economies (EMEs), which are generally at 
an earlier stage of financial development and thus may be more vulnerable to dislocations of foreign 
capital. The results are robust to alternative measures of financial openness, and to the division of the 
sample between countries with fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. Importantly, the economic 
significance of the result on financial openness for the full sample and advanced economies (AEs) is 
large, such that the effect of openness generally dominates the effect of surges in capital inflows. 
Capital controls, found elsewhere to have little effect on the probability of capital flow surge episodes 
(Forbes and Warnock, 2012), are confirmed to be unhelpful to shield countries from crises. Yet volatile 
capital flows and other factors like excessive real appreciation, low reserve adequacy, and rapid credit 
growth are important risk factors for currency crises. 





– and particularly debt flows – are important contributors to credit excesses and the chance of crises, 
particularly for EMEs. The interaction terms in panel regressions show that the same scale of gross 
capital inflows can have larger effects on the vulnerability of EMEs to rapid private domestic credit 
growth, credit excesses and banking crises. We find that financial openness has mixed results on credit 
growth and the credit gap, but no significant impact on the chance of banking crises (if anything, 
countries that liberalize are less likely to undergo a banking crisis in the immediately following 
quarters). Put differently, relatively closed economies are – once again – not sheltered from the effects 
of foreign capital flows on systemic stability. On the other hand, countries with high levels of private 
domestic credit to GDP1 are more vulnerable to crises. 
With the cross-country data over the period 1975-2011, the analysis of Part I also shows that the 
build-up of vulnerabilities prior to 2008 and the materialization of the global financial crisis had a 
number of parallels with currency and banking crises in the preceding three decades. This has 
importance for the literature on early warning indicators. While early warning models have often been 
criticized for their out-of-sample performance and their inability to predict the recent crisis (Rose and 
Spiegel, 2008), there is other research – including that contained in chapter 2 – which shows that such 
models can help signal vulnerabilities out of sample. In line with earlier research (Kindleberger, 1979; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Mishkin, 1999), we confirm that strong capital inflows, real exchange 
rate appreciation and strong credit growth tend to precede both currency and banking crises, and that 
banking crises may lead to and be aggravated by currency crises. Through the lens of the well-known 
“trilemma,” countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are found to be especially vulnerability to 
banking crises following a period of strong inflows, but it appears that a closed capital account is not 
the optimal policy solution to prevent crises. 
With its focus on policy, part II of the dissertation was guided by the following research questions: 
 Can the commitment of large-scale official support make actual support unnecessary, and if so, 
under what conditions? 
 Have the unconventional monetary policies of the ECB been able to affect interest rates, thereby 
restoring the monetary policy transmission process? 
 How has the recent UMP in Japan affected income inequality? 
 
The theoretical model in chapter 4 shows that large-scale official support can in fact cause credit 
spreads to decline, improving the solvency of a distressed borrower and thus promoting a virtuous 
cycle in the borrower’s finances. This is most likely to occur when the size of support is large relative 
                                                     
1 This measure is often used as a proxy for financial development. In line with the discussion in chapter 2, I would 
argue that institutional quality and supporting (macroeconomic and macroprudential) policies are more relevant 





to the borrower’s balance sheet; when the creditor is highly solvent (“deep-pocketed”) and when there 
is adequate policy conditionality which can ensure that the borrower takes measures to improve 
solvency. If support is successful in lowering uncertainty about the valuation of the borrower’s assets 
– for example because of a stress test, or because it removes the perceived risk of disorderly “tail risk” 
scenarios – then it can represent a Pareto improvement, rather than simply a risk transfer from the 
borrower to the creditor. Applying this to real-life examples, chapter 4 argues that the US Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) was primarily effective because of the stress test. The 2009 increase in 
IMF resources had a downward impact on borrower spreads, but it is difficult to disentangle this from 
other concurrent developments, including TARP and general improvements in global risk sentiment. 
The German and Spanish bank support programs (SoFFin and FROB) were used effectively to support 
banks, while the Irish liability guarantees were unsuccessful in the sense that the Irish government 
became distressed and had to request EU/IMF support. Finally, SMP and the EFSF/EFSM were 
unsuccessful in stemming the increase in sovereign spreads during the euro area debt crisis, in part 
because of limited size and concerns about the actual firepower or strength of conditionality. OMT 
were successful due to the credibly large size and the link with ESM/IMF programs, which ensures 
policy conditionality. The specific experience of the ECB’s unconventional policies, including SMP, the 
LTROs and OMT is further explored in chapter 5. The counterfactual exercise confirms that SMP and 
the LTROs only had a brief downward impact on credit spreads, and that they were much less 
successful than OMT. 
Unconventional monetary policy can be enacted for different reasons, including both the risk of 
financial instability – which may impair the monetary transmission mechanism and threaten central 
banks’ success in inflation targeting – and the inability to ease further with interest rate levels at the 
zero lower bound. The international experience shows that, compared to peer institutions such as the 
Fed and the Bank of England, before the introduction of QE the ECB made only moderate changes to 
the composition of its balance sheet after 2008.2 This contrasts with the experience of the Bank of 
Japan, which had embarked on UMP starting in 2000, and expanded its balance sheet aggressively 
after 2008. This was apparent during the 2010 Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME) program, but 
even more so with the quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE) program, implemented from April 
2013 onward. Because of the sheer size of these interventions and their large effects on financial 
markets, the Japanese case may hold importance evidence for the effects of UMP with relevance for 
other countries. 
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 Moreover, after the period of analysis in chapter 5, the ECB’s balance sheet shrank considerably – from a high 
of 31.5% of euro area GDP in July 2012 to 19.7% in September 2014. In line with the expanded asset purchase 
program, announced in January 2015, the Eurosystem has embarked on asset purchases of €60 billion per month. 





In chapter 6, our empirical analysis with a VAR model finds evidence that UMP increased income 
inequality in Japan after 2008. This is robust to an alternative Cholesky ordering and alternative 
measures both of UMP and income inequality. Overall, while the study only focuses on Japan, this 
suggests that UMP may have different effects than conventional monetary policies, and that greater 
income inequality may be one unwanted side effect. 
 
7.2. Shortcomings of the research methods 
Both the empirical and theoretical approaches taken here may suffer from shortcomings which could 
affect the direction and strength of results, as well as their interpretation. While efforts have been 
made to address these shortcomings, this section will review the potential problems, how they have 
been mitigated and what alternative approaches exist. 
A first set of shortcomings relates to the definition and measurement of financial openness. In 
chapters 2 and 3, we have used the Chinn-Ito Index, which is useful particularly for its wide country 
coverage and sensitivity to different types of de jure restrictions on current and capital transactions 
(Quinn, Schindler and Toyoda, 2011). Yet other researchers may be interested in the effect of de facto 
openness – such as actual cross-border integration, e.g. as measured by the international investment 
position – or in specific types of restrictions, such as those specific to financial sector transactions. 
While chapter 2 does provide robustness checks, a further distinction between types of restrictions or 
a focus on individual country experiences is beyond the scope of this analysis. The related set of 
macroprudential policy measures, particularly foreign currency regulations (Ostry, Qureshi, Ghosh and 
Chamon, 2011), may be more promising than residency-based controls, but have not yet become 
available for a large enough sample of countries and over a long enough time period for the specific 
approach chosen here. Analysis with these measures may yet show that there are policy alternatives 
for managing volatile capital flows. 
A second potential issue in the long cross-country panel regressions is endogeneity. As discussed in 
chapter 2, financial openness is correlated with institutional quality, and thus may be associated with 
a lower chance of crisis. This is why we included the ICRG index of institutional quality and a dummy 
for EMEs in our analysis. Yet other macroeconomic variables (such as growth, inflation, credit growth, 
government deficit, etc.) are also correlated with one another and with our variables of interest, 
including crisis probability. Using lagged values of the independent variables and having as complete 
a specification as possible are two options to address these issues. Given the lack of convincing 
candidates for indicators that are correlated with openness or capital flows, but not with crises, we 
have not attempted to use instrumental variables. Yet the concerns about potential endogeneity have 
meant that we avoid making strong causal statements about the effects, and rather refer to the factors 





A third potential problem is cross-country heterogeneity. We have argued that country experiences 
are comparable enough that the same variables can be used to gauge crisis vulnerability across 
different advanced and emerging market economies (sometimes with distinctions between the two 
groups). This implies missing some specificities of different countries and different crisis periods – each 
of which had their own causes and spawned a new “generation” of models.  Again, this amalgamation 
of countries is inherent in the cross-country panel approach; it can be partly defended by the fact that 
it does yield results both in and out of sample, meaning that there do appear to be common patterns 
in different countries’ (crisis) experiences. Yet to make strong statements about policy effectiveness in 
individual countries, this has to be complemented with country-specific studies – of the type 
conducted in chapter 6 or in the case studies used in chapter 5. 
A fourth issue, of particular relevance for chapters 5 and 6, is the short time series data available 
for the analysis of unconventional monetary policies. While there is a large (and ever-growing) list of 
currency and banking crises to be studied, there are as yet fewer countries that have embarked on 
UMP. Even for Japan, which has used UMP since 2001, there are far fewer data points than for 
conventional policies – and the aggressive easing of the QQE program is only very recent. This is why 
the VAR analysis in chapter 6 has had to use a relatively small number of variables and only one 
quarterly lag. The comparison of central bank balance sheets in chapter 5 is based on a small set of 
indicators, while the factor analysis is done with weekly data. As the US, euro area, UK, Japan and other 
countries continue with UMP, there will be a longer time series for analysis, which is already making 
much more new research possible (e.g. Moessner, de Haan and Jansen, 2014; Rogers, Scotti and 
Wright, 2014). 
Finally, theoretical modeling by nature involves simplifying assumptions that can limit the realism 
of such analysis. The analysis in chapter 4 has relied on a partial equilibrium model, rather than a more 
sophisticated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, which is characterized by an 
encompassing system of equations that ties together all the variables in the analysis. Yet given the 
recent controversies of DSGE models (see e.g. Kinsella, 2013)3 I do not consider this to be a major 
drawback. Approaches like global games and stock-flow consistent modeling may be more fruitful 
alternatives. The key disadvantage of the model in chapter 4 is that it can only model expectations and 
uncertainty in a rather primitive manner, and cannot capture some important phenomena, such as 
investor herding behavior in debt markets or repeated interactions between the official creditor and 
distressed borrower. This is why it is important to compare the results with actual case studies, to 
determine whether the theoretical results actually hold in practice. 
 
                                                     
3 See also Willem Buiter, “The unfortunate uselessness of most ‘state of the art’ academic monetary economics,” 





7.3 Avenues for future research 
In addition to continuing to test the empirical and theoretical validity of this dissertation’s results, each 
of the projects also gives rise to related research questions. Many of the methods used here could be 
applicable to new issues of relevance to international financial stability policy. In this section, I offer 
an opinion on where the priorities for research in this area should lie, both for myself and others 
working on similar issues. 
First, there is much more scope to study macroprudential responses to volatile capital flows. If 
countries maintain open capital accounts and direct controls are largely ineffective, it is important to 
identify other policies that are able to mitigate the risks of strong debt inflows or sudden outflows. 
Measures which limit currency mismatches, excessive short-term funding or excessive credit growth 
may help to limit the build-up of risks; yet whether such policies are effective and when is an empirical 
question. As credit intermediation in many countries shifts from banks to other institutions (“shadow 
banking”) and financial markets, it is important to gauge whether macroprudential instruments target 
banks and non-banks equally. The recent work by the IMF and others on codifying macroprudential 
measures (Cerutti, Claessens and Laeven, 2015; Claessens, Ghosh and Mihet, 2014; Vandenbussche, 
Vogel and Detragiache, 2012) offers a wealth of new data for cross-country empirical analysis. This 
should help identify whether (different types of) macroprudential measures can reduce the probability 
of currency and banking crises, or dampen (the bank and non-bank components of) the financial cycle. 
Empirical research can also help identify whether instruments can mitigate the systemic risks of market 
illiquidity, particularly in international credit markets. 
Second, while this research has focused on currency and banking crises, there are also important 
links between these and sovereign debt crises. The European debt crisis shares many commonalities 
with previous emerging market crises, including the interdependencies (“doom loop”) between banks 
and sovereigns. Large-scale official support to banks by sovereigns is only one half of the problem; the 
large and growing holdings of sovereign debt by banks may also be an important element of 
interdependency and a future systemic risk. The historical experience of a panel of countries could 
show whether sovereign support to banks or banks’ sovereign exposures contribute significantly to 
the correlation between bank and sovereign risk, and could offer insights for policy in the euro area 
and for the design of prudential regulation for banks. Furthermore, empirical methods can help in the 
design of new prudential rules (e.g. for risk weights and concentration limits) for bank holdings of 
government debt, particularly by illuminating the impact of potential changes and giving advice for the 
transition to a new, more sustainable prudential framework. 
Third, the growing experience of major central banks with unconventional policies will likely spawn 
much new research on effectiveness of UMP, both in repairing monetary transmission and achieving 





equities, currencies and real estate – could be far-reaching, and will become even more apparent when 
UMP are eventually discontinued. Empirical methods such as factor analysis could be used to analyze 
the UMP component of specific asset prices, both to estimate the extent of overvaluation and the 
potential downward adjustment without UMP. Yet ultimately, these issues will remain surrounded by 
a considerable degree of uncertainty, meaning that policies will likely be enacted without a fully 
quantified understanding of their effects. At the time of writing, the future policies of the ECB (which 
has recently embarked on QE) and the Fed (which is expected to raise interest rates later this year) are 
subject to considerable speculation. 
Fourth, the combination of excessively high debt levels in economies around the world and ongoing 
incentives to take on new debt – such as debt bias in tax systems, and low interest rates – mean that 
many of the trends which led to the crisis may continue unabated. Given that high levels of credit 
intermediation are usually accompanied by growing interconnectedness (a tighter network) in the 
financial system, the current economic growth model of many countries remains highly vulnerable to 
new crises. Research can help develop “out-of-the-box” alternatives for current policies, e.g. to 
encourage equity financing of firms and equity-like instruments for governments, such as GDP-linked 
bonds (Sandleris and Wright, 2013), or to come up with alternatives to UMP, such as “helicopter drops” 
by central banks.4 There may also be arguments for much stricter and more consistent limits on 
leverage (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). Ultimately, changing the incentives for excessive debt 
financing (both domestically and cross-border) will likely go beyond the mandate of central banks, 
supervisors and multilateral organizations, and require political decision making, yet research can play 
a central role in developing policy options for governments to take.  
Finally, growing data on wealth and income distributions, including at higher (annual or quarterly) 
frequencies allows for much more research on the drivers of income and wealth inequality. While we 
do not fully understand the impact of UMP on inequality, this can be investigated for new countries 
and regions, including the US and euro area. Empirical analysis can look at the impact of UMP on 
intermediate real indicators, such as employment, output stability and investment, in addition to more 
granular financial variables such as equity, bond and real estate prices. If wealth and income inequality 
can be linked to financial instability, as some studies have argued (Rajan, 2010; Rancière and Kumhof, 
2010; van Treeck, 2013; Gu and Huang, 2014) then central banks may be wise to invest in research into 
the effects of their own policies on inequality, and what policies could be enacted to mitigate these 
unwanted side effects. This could be informed by empirical research on the effect of monetary, tax, 
social and structural policies for a sufficiently broad sample of countries.   
                                                     






7.4 Potential policy implications 
The research undertaken in this dissertation aims explicitly at informing policy outcomes. Thus, while 
many of the results remain to be verified by further work, the dissertation will close with four broad 
potential policy implications that follow from the research. 
First, the research on currency and banking crises suggests that despite the damaging effects of 
strong debt inflows, countries have made the correct choice in opening their capital accounts. In line 
with research on the thresholds of financial development (Kose, Prasad and Taylor, 2011), this work 
suggests that financial openness may bring stability benefits as countries develop. Capital controls – 
while perhaps necessary in specific cases – are not promising as a general policy response to shield 
economies from volatile capital flows. Instead, it is impingent on other policies to prevent the excessive 
leverage and credit growth, currency and maturity mismatches, excessive real appreciation and other 
vulnerabilities that lead to currency and banking crises. Implementing the necessary macroeconomic 
and prudential policies requires strong institutions, which are more likely to develop when capital 
accounts are open. 
Second, the research suggests that early warning models should be actively used in policy. While 
each financial crisis has its own characteristics, there are considerable commonalities across countries 
and time. Even with uncertainty and with the lags in the reporting of macroeconomic data, early 
warning models can provide useful signals in real time.5 Of course, it is not sufficient to merely identify 
which countries may experience a crisis; policy should aim to prevent crises. And measures that 
increase the resilience of one country to a foreign crisis (such as reducing financial institutions’ 
exposures to the vulnerable country) can be counterproductive at the aggregate level. Yet such signals 
can also be communicated to the countries in question as a call to intervene and slow the build-up of 
financial imbalances. By comparing the experience with different policies, early warning models and 
similar regressions can also derive broadly applicable policy lessons. 
Third, when a crisis has materialized and authorities struggle to develop a crisis response, they 
should only use a “bazooka” when it is likely that it will work. If – like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
2008, or Greece in 2010 – the borrower is clearly insolvent, then it is better to look for options for 
orderly debt restructuring rather than support. The same is true if the official creditor does not have 
the financial capacity for the promises it would like to make – like the Irish government in the support 
for its banks. However, when support could be effective, such as in the euro area crisis, it should be 
(more than) sufficiently large – and accompanied by constructive and verifiable policy conditionality 
                                                     
5 As one anecdotal example, initial results of the model in chapter 2 were described in an internal policy note in 
December 2011. As of Q2 2011, the latest available quarter of date, we found that Brazil, South Africa and Turkey 
were most vulnerable to currency crisis. All three of these countries were part of the “fragile 5” which were 





which will improve the solvency of the borrower. The strategy of “go big or go home” works best when 
conditionality can be guaranteed, and when support is accompanied by measures that reduce overall 
uncertainty. In the future, stress testing will remain an important complement to support for banks 
and other financial institutions, as a means of reducing uncertainty about asset valuations. For 
sovereign borrowers, it is crucial to ensure adequate policy conditionality – which in the case of OMT 
has meant a close link to the ESM and the IMF. 
Fourth, while UMP is often a last resort of central banks fighting with deflation risks and financial 
instability, it may have deleterious medium-term effects on inequality and thus the chance of future 
instability. At the very least, central banks should communicate openly on the expected effects of their 
policies on the income and wealth distribution. Moreover, central banks can recommend 
compensating measures by governments, such as fiscal transfers and structural reform. While equity 
considerations are often considered outside the mandate of central banks, this may be only one more 
of the dogmas that the crisis has forced the economics profession to reconsider. 
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